1/25/92

Dear Sol,

Thanks for thr Lukas story from the Times on the Havana meeting between those of both sides involved in the 1962 Cuba missile crisis. If he had not had the long-time Times interest in Castro-bashing he could have been more informative. He'd have had much more space for reporting and information in any event.

To the degree possible for me I've been trying to be informed about these meetings, now five.

After finishing my first book I did not plan further JFK assassination writing. I did plan and research "Tiger to Ride: the Untold Story of the Cuba Missile Crisis." And then continued assassination work.

In the midst of that crisis, while still farming but liquidating the farming, I made a contemporaneous analysis that was substantially correct. The first Wednesday of that crisis (Wednesday was my delivery day) I discussed my analysis with the then foreign editor of the Washington Post, named something like Homer Thornbury, and the then National Symphony manager, H. Robert Rogers, who had been the Click editor when I was its Washington correspondent. I do not now recall whether I then had the time to make and file any notes on this.

The essense of my analysis was that Khruschev put those medium-range missiles in Cuba not with the intent of using them but only to give JFK his own "Tiger to Ride," to give JFK the choice between war and peace, the Cubans, as Lukas does not say, fearing another U.S. or U.S.-sponsored invasion, having invoked its "mutual" assistance pact with the USSR.

The Post had come to the same tentative conclusion and then abandoned it and did not report it!

From what has been reported from thes meetings I may well have been wrong on some of the details but I was essentially correct. I did not know that the 30-mile range missiles were there. But they had only defensive capabilities. I also then did not believe that any evidence of the nuclear warheads for the larger missiles existed in what the US disclosed. But basically I was correct and Khruschev did accomplish what he set out to accomplish -end the invasion danger without war and turn the world toward peace.

Any examination of JFK's record after that also confirms this in many ways. Two are his initiating and getting the limited test-ban agreement and his one-world speech at American University.

What has been disclosed makes it clear that JFK also learned that he could not depend on his advisers, all but two of him gave him bad advice until Khruschev offered the proposal Bobby was first to grab. Adlai Stevenson understood the situation correctly, as John McCone, then CIA director, also did initially. McCone was then talked out of it by his associates. Many thanks and best to you all,

Harold